Educational reform and policy implementation in Hong Kong by Morris, P & Scott, I
Educational Reform and Policy Implementation in Hong Kong
Paul Morris and Ian Scott
(Published in Journal of Education Policy, 2003, Vol. 18, No. 1)
            Research  on  implementation  around  the  world  indicates  that  many  educational 
reforms  designed  to  improve  the  quality  of  schooling  have  been  more  rhetorical  than 
substantive  in their  impact  on the organisation  of  schools  and classrooms (Weiler,  1998; 
Fullan, 1991; Snyder, Bolin and Zumwalt, 1992). Schools and classrooms do change, but the 
extent  and  direction  of  change  is  not  always  consistent  with  the  intentions  of  policy 
initiatives. The same applies in Hong Kong, where a substantial body of literature (see Morris 
1996, Adamson et al, 2000) has documented the gap between the intentions of policy makers 
and  their  implementation  in  schools.  The  gap  has  been  especially  pronounced  in  those 
reforms attempting to change the prevailing styles of teaching and learning (Morris & Morris, 
2000). The reasons for this gap correspond to those described in the burgeoning international 
literature on policy implementation, which has attempted to identify the factors that serve as 
barriers to change. However, the traditional focus on the gap between educational policy and 
its implementation often results in what Goodson (2000) terms a form of ‘implementationist 
myopia.’ This is characterized by research which views policy as unproblematic and schools 
(and  teachers)  are  evaluated  from  a  technical  perspective  to  assess  how  faithfully  they 
implement  the  wisdom of  the policy makers.  The corollary of such a perspective  is  that 
teachers and schools are portrayed as the major impediments to change. Our initial premise is 
that the impact of educational reforms is influenced by a range of contextual factors and that, 
in the case of Hong Kong, it is the political context that has served as a powerful influence on 
both the nature of policy and its impact in schools.                                                          
We begin with a discussion of how implementation theory might contribute to our 
understanding of the difficulties of achieving educational reform in Hong Kong, in particular 
the  limitations  of  what  has  largely  been  a  ‘top-down’  approach  to  social  programme 
implementation. In the second section of the paper, we seek an explanation of the reasons for 
this approach in the structure of the colonial regime and in its perennial problem of trying to 
reduce its legitimacy deficit while, at the same time, ensuring that it did not, in the process, 
create  the  conditions  for  social  and  political  disruption.  Our  contention  is  that  these 
difficulties resulted in symbolic education policies that promised great changes in teaching 
and learning but which, in reality, did little to disturb prevailing practice. In the third section 
of the paper, we provide some illustrations of how these education policies were formulated 
and  implemented  and  with  what  results.   In  the  final  section,  we  analyse  the  policy 
implementation environment under the post-1997 government. We argue that it has inherited 
many of the constraints faced by the colonial regime and that it has, in addition, experienced 
the difficulties inherent in a disarticulated political system, difficulties which have adversely 
affected implementation. Education policies, in consequence, have remained largely at the 
level  of  good  intentions;  reform  has  proved  elusive  and,  when  it  has  been  attempted, 
opposition has mobilised rapidly and sometimes successfully. 
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IMPLEMENTATION THEORY 
             Those who write about implementation theory have long since questioned the notion 
that ‘top-down’ or control models of implementation alone can be used effectively to achieve 
social  policy  goals  (Sabatier,  1986).   Within  centralized  organizations,  there  are  often 
problems with the transmission of policy intent from the most senior levels through the mid-
level managers to the point of delivery. Many ‘policies’ remain impossible dreams that are 
incapable  of  implementation  because  of  an  absence  of  financial  resources  or  qualified 
personnel or because they are insufficiently  specific  or because they are ambiguous.  The 
middle manager is sometimes faced with the task of reconciling the irreconcilable, a situation 
that  often produces  outcomes characterised  by ‘grand pretensions,  faulty execution,  puny 
results’  (Elmore,  1997:241).  In  addition,  both the  empirical  evidence  (Lipsky,  1980) and 
common sense suggest that  the street–level  bureaucrats  who actually deliver  the policy –
teachers, doctors and social workers, for example – will always be able to modify, or perhaps 
even  to  veto,  instructions  from central  policy-makers  should  they  choose  to  do  so.  The 
alternative  ‘bottom-up’  approach,  however,  in  which  street-level  bureaucrats  might  have 
significant  inputs  into  policy-making,  or  a  very  decentralized  system in  which  decisions 
would  be  made  within  the  community,  has  never  held  much  appeal  for  the  Hong Kong 
government. Although, as we shall see, there has been some ambivalence within government 
about the mode of delivery, that is, the extent to which the state or market should dominate in  
educational provision, there has never been any question that ultimate control over policy 
should remain firmly in the hands of the government.
             Faced with the fundamental systemic constraint of a ‘top-down’ orientation, Hong 
Kong policy-makers, who actually wanted to see their policy goals realized, might take either 
or both of two courses of action. The first would be to identify what Dyer (2000:58) has 
called  ‘veto  points’,  institutional  or  other  potential  bottlenecks  which  would  need  to  be 
overcome to allow policy to be implemented successfully. These veto points might include, 
for  example,  weaknesses  in  policy  formulation  or  coordination  at  the  centre,  other 
organizational  constraints  such as  problems at  the  point  of  delivery or  conflicting  policy 
objectives or the activities of powerful pressure groups. Many of the veto points necessarily 
involve the relationship between policy-makers and implementers. To resolve problems that 
might  arise between them implies that a bargaining process is required to reach common 
ground. As Warwick (quoted in Dyer, 2000:56) puts it, ‘effective implementation requires 
transactions between policy proponents, implementers and others whose support is necessary 
for action to happen’. Other theorists make similar points, advocating, for example, the need 
for explicit organization models for social program implementation which might include a 
bargaining model (Elmore, 1997). They assume, however, often with the American context in 
mind, that forums exist in which the parties come to the table, if not as equal partners, at least  
with the expectation that attempts will be made to identify an agreed path to achieve policy 
goals.
             The Hong Kong government has shown little interest, either in colonial days or in its 
post-1997 manifestation, in pursuing such a transactional approach towards education policy 
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implementation.  Policy  initiatives  in  education  are  justified  after  periods  of  wide  public 
consultation in which the original view proposed by the government tends to prevail or by 
reference  to  the  reports  of  ‘wise  men’  employed  by  the  government  to  suggest  future 
directions. Subsequent policy changes are often made with relatively little consultation with 
those  who  are  charged  with  implementing  them.  Interaction  between  policy-makers  and 
implementers does, of course, occur but there seems very often to be an implied separation of 
roles.  The  government  sees  itself  as  responsible  for  the  provision  of  resources,  the 
formulation of programmes and the identification of key values in the education system. It 
does  not,  generally  speaking,  see  its  task  as  extending  to  the  active  management  of  the 
implementation  process.  That  is  seen  to  be  the  responsibility  of  the  teachers  and 
administrators who run the schools and other educational institutions and who are expected to 
follow government  instructions.   In  the  following sections,  we suggest  reasons why this 
approach has emerged. In summary, we believe that the major factors have been historically 
ambivalent attitudes towards state involvement in educational provision; the fear that opening 
forums  and  engaging  in  dialogue  with  active  constituencies  might  compromise  the 
government’s  position  and  lead  to  political  confrontation;  the  concern  that  actively 
monitoring  programmes  might  consume  too  many  organizational  resources;  and  the 
fragmentation of educational interest groups which makes it difficult for the government to 
deal with  authoritative bodies on specific issues. 
             A second approach that  might  help  to  overcome the  limitations  of  a  ‘top-down’ 
orientation  would  be  to  seek  to  establish  community  agreement  on  values  and  then  to 
translate them into policy. At its most general, such an approach attempts the impossible task 
of legislating ‘motherhood’ values into action, an enterprise that has been embraced by the 
post-1997  government  in  Hong  Kong  with  predictably  limited  success  (see  Education 
Commission,  1999:  9-20).  Even  with  consultation  which  was  more  extensive  than  that 
employed by its colonial predecessor, the post-1997 Education Commission was only able to 
secure  agreement  on  vague  generalities,  such  as  the  desirability  of  ‘lifelong  learning’ 
(Kennedy, 2002).  In a more specific form, however, it is possible to seek the agreement on 
values between policymakers and implementers on how a particular programme will proceed 
and what its objectives will be. These programmes would represent changes in target group 
behaviour but would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve without the consent and active 
participation of those who would bring about the change. We have not been able to identify 
Hong  Kong  government  education  programmes  where  this  specific  approach  has  been 
adopted.  The  government  has  prompted  an  extensive  discussion  of  values  in  education, 
perhaps with the hope of  securing implementers’  adoption  of the values  that  it  hopes to 
promote, but without the kind of managed implementation programme that might see those 
values translated into action. 
                                     
             Implementation theory tells us that, if the problems of a top-down approach are not 
addressed  or  modified  in  ways  which  take  into  account  the  importance  of  street-level 
bureaucrats,  social  policy implementation is unlikely to be successful.  In the Hong Kong 
education  context,  the  problems  generated  by  its  ‘top-down’  orientation  have  only  been 
superficially  addressed  and  policy  has  consequently  remained  largely  symbolic.  In  the 
following section, we examine the constraints on implementation that are derived from its 
colonial legacy. 
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SYSTEMIC CONSTRAINTS ON IMPLEMENTATION UNDER COLONIALISM
             Colonial regimes, by their very nature, require top-down bureaucratic structures. The 
rule  of  the few over  the many,  pressures from the home government  to  ensure balanced 
budgets, and a shortage of qualified personnel all mean that the system is designed to ensure 
that  the  decisions  of  those  at  the  top  of  the  bureaucratic  pyramid  are  faithfully  and 
unquestioningly implemented by those at the bottom. Colonial regimes, especially in the pre-
war  period,  usually  had  limited  social  policy  functions  so  that  the  specific  problems 
associated with social programme implementation were not immediately experienced. In the 
Hong Kong case, the bureaucracy developed to the point where it had largely autonomous 
departments with efficient hierarchical structures carrying out a restricted range of functions. 
The strengths of such systems are that they do not require substantial investments in policy-
making; resources can be devoted to the base of the implementation pyramid to ensure that 
the words of the senior bureaucrats do indeed become fact (Scott, 1987). The disadvantages 
of  such  systems  are  that  they  do  not  allow  either  for  the  extensive  lateral  coordination 
between departments  nor for the vertical  interaction with street-level bureaucrats  that  are 
necessary for effective social policy implementation. Despite repeated attempt to reform the 
system,  power  in  Hong  Kong  still  resides  in  a  centralized  bureaucracy  which  has  been 
required to take on increasingly complex social policy initiatives. 
             Hong Kong’s  economic  success  has  further  exacerbated  the tension between the 
government’s avowedly laissez-faire philosophy and the provision of social policy outputs. 
The  government  itself  attributes  this  success  to  keeping  the  bureaucracy  small  and  its 
intervention  in  the  economy  and  in  society  to  a  minimum.  Social  policy  outputs  are 
sometimes  justified  not  as  desirable  ends in  themselves  but  as  a  means  towards  a  more 
productive, prosperous and healthy future (see Sutherland, 2002). Hong Kong, accordingly, is 
often seen to fit within the liberal or residualist model of welfare. In this model, welfare, 
broadly defined to include education, health and housing, is left principally to the market and 
is delivered through user payments for private schools, health care and housing. Governments 
intervene only to provide for those who cannot provide themselves and may still rely on non-
government organizations to deliver services even if the government itself is providing the 
funding.  There  is  little  doubt  that  the  residualist  model  is  the  Hong Kong government’s 
preferred  mode  of  welfare  delivery.  However,  the  territory’s  political  legacy  somewhat 
complicates the issue (McLaughlin, 1993:109; Gibson, 2002:37-46). The colonial regime in 
Hong Kong suffered from a substantial legitimacy deficit and welfare, cleverly distributed, 
represented a useful means of reducing that deficit. Hong Kong, in this sense, is closer to a 
conservative model of welfare in which the government itself provides for social services and 
increases its legitimacy by doing so (Esping-Andersen, 1990).
             Unlike liberal welfare regimes, authoritarian regimes cannot legitimate their actions 
through the ballot box, a free press and a vigorous civil society.  For much of its colonial 
history, Hong Kong had no elected element in its legislature, a largely uncritical press and a 
civil society that did not impact significantly upon the polity until the 1970s. To justify its  
contention that it was a good government meant providing the highly prized social policy 
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outputs  –housing,  education,  and health  care-that  the  population  so  clearly  wanted.  This 
posed a classical dilemma. Should the government deliver those services itself and maintain 
control and derive credit from the provision of these services? Or should it instead rely, as its 
laissez –faire philosophy prescribed, on the private sector and non-government organizations 
to do the work for it? Prior to the Second World War, only minimal services were delivered, 
very largely by private organizations with limited subventions from the government. After 
the war, there were signs of more state attention to welfare driven partly by the economic 
problem of the need for the land occupied by squatters, which led to the development of a 
resettlement and public housing programme, and partly by the political problem posed by the 
communist threat which led to more state control and provision of primary education. Until 
1972, however,  it  would probably be accurate  to place Hong Kong within the residualist 
model; the aim was to provide welfare for the most needy and for school children.
          After the riots of 1966-67, notions of welfare gradually began to change. By the time 
MacLehose became governor in 1971, it had become clear both that the population greatly 
desired the social policy outputs that the government, fortunately, was able to fund and that 
their  positive  response  to  the  provision  of  these  goods  reduced  the  possibility  of  social 
instability and increased the regime’s  legitimacy.  More state welfare became increasingly 
identified with good government and, in providing these collective public goods, the regime 
gradually expanded its constituency of support. Public housing was eventually provided for 
almost  50% of the population,  more places were available for secondary school students, 
more people claimed health and welfare benefits. That is not say that provision was ever 
entirely adequate or of high quality but the quantity of provision did provide a degree of  
regime support in the 1970s which was the envy of later governments who often sought in 
rather different times, to emulate the tactics of the MacLehose administration by expanding 
welfare provision.
         The increase in welfare provision under the auspices of the state did not initially 
create major political problems for the colonial regime. The bureaucracy was very capable of 
providing the physical infrastructure in support of these new initiatives. New towns, more 
housing estates, more schools and hospitals were constructed with relative ease but often with 
little thought about what was going to happen once the buildings were actually occupied. The 
government  had  not  arrived  at  the  point  where  it  was  actively  seeking  to  manage  and 
implement new social programmes; the belief, rooted in previous history, was that welfare 
provision  alone  would  be  enough.  This  belief  was  reinforced  in  the  1970s  by  adverse 
experiences  of  what  happened  when  the  government  did  seek  to  deal  directly  and 
emphatically  with  teachers  and students.  In  1972,  the  government  became involved  in  a 
dispute  over  the  salaries  of  certificated  teachers.  Although  the  government  eventually 
conceded on the issue, the dispute led to the formation of the Professional Teachers Union in 
1974 (Leung, 1999:146).  Its  head, Szeto Wah, eventually became a leading figure in the 
democratic movement and was frequently at odds with the government. In 1978, for example, 
when the government closed the Precious Blood Secondary School and dismissed sixteen 
teachers,  the  union  came  out  strongly  in  support  of  the  dismissed  teachers  and  gained 
considerable  support  as  a  consequence.  The  school  was  one  of  the  more  progressive 
secondary schools in Hong Kong and government action was seen to be retrogressive and a 
warning to teachers that traditional authority structures in schools were not to be challenged. 
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The union, however, was able to generate support from other sections of the community and 
over 10,000 people attended a rally to oppose the government’s decision (Leung, 1999:154). 
By 1982, the Professional Teachers Union was the largest single union in the territory.
             In  the  transitional  period  to  Chinese  sovereignty  (1984-1997),  the  government 
became very wary about intervening with the ways in which teachers and local administrators 
ran  their  programmes.  Expanded  provision  alone  was  sufficient  to  generate  the  political 
support that regime required. Its legitimacy and its relationship with China was already so 
strained by the proposed post-handover political arrangements  that it did not wish to risk the 
possibility of domestic confrontations over the implementation of its education policies. Thus 
the stage was set  for the introduction of policies  that were largely symbolic,  designed to 
reassure the population that the quality of their  children’s education was constantly being 
improved, but lacking the substantive management and change processes that would see the 
programmes effectively implemented. 
SYMBOLIC POLICY
         A critical watershed in education policy occurred in 1978 with the introduction of 
nine years of compulsory education and the subsequent provision of places to year 11 for 
about 90% of the age cohort. After 1978, the educational policy agenda shifted away from a 
focus on providing more places to a concern for the quality of schooling.  As with its housing 
policy, the government’s capacity to expand the infrastructure and build more schools in a 
short period of time was a remarkable achievement. However, this was not paralleled by its 
capacity  to  develop  a  system of  mass  schooling  designed  to  support  Hong Kong’s  post 
industrial economy. Our concern in this paper is with the reforms, initiatives and innovations 
that attempt to improve the quality of schooling. Quality proved more difficult to deliver than 
quantity.  Our argument is based on the premise that most educational policies and reforms 
promoted prior  to 1997 that  were designed to improve the quality of schooling served a 
primarily  symbolic  purpose.  Their  critical  function  was to  demonstrate  the  government’s 
concern to address educational issues. Where implementation could not be avoided, strategies 
were  employed  which  involved  compromise  or  capitulation  in  an  attempt  to  maintain  a 
consensus  and minimize  tension and conflict.  The outcome was that  the expectation  and 
extent of change in schools was minimal. Thus, for example, the promotion of new subjects 
designed to broaden the curriculum  (for example, Social Studies, Liberal Studies and a core 
curriculum in the 1970s); mother tongue language instruction; less didactic pedagogic styles 
(for example, the activity approach); and civic, sex and moral education were all essentially 
advisory and exhortatory statements of policy intentions. Their adoption was not mandatory 
and it was up to schools to decide whether to try to implement these changes. On the whole, 
there was little incentive to do so as the prevailing system of public assessment and rewards 
placed a premium on the maintenance of the status quo. Specifically, as far as pupils, parents 
and teachers were concerned the use of English and a focus on the high status academic 
subjects were more important. This perception was not inaccurate: a pupil who performed 
well in areas of the curriculum other than languages and mathematics was unlikely to go to a 
‘good’  school  or  to  progress  to  the  end  of  secondary  schooling.  Many schools  dropped 
subjects  such  as  art,  music  and  history  from  their  timetable  as  these  were  seen  to  be 
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peripheral to the task of preparing pupils  for the high status public examinations (Morris 
1997).
         Although  some  officials  were  committed  to  the  need  for  substantial  changes  to 
education  policy  and  practice  and  although  there  was  much  encouragement  from  and 
heightened bureaucratic  activity within the government  to promote its reforms, there was 
limited support in the form of direct management and implementation of the policy initiative. 
There  was,  instead,  a  reliance  on  indirect  policy  actions,  which  often  took  the  form of 
inducements such as the provision of extra teachers if schools adopted new policies and the 
creation of a new arm of the bureaucracy designed to support the reform. The result was a 
façade  of  compliance  as  schools  attempted  to  obtain  extra  resources  but  no  substantial 
attempt was made to monitor whether the policy (for example, using Chinese as the medium 
of instruction) was actually implemented.  To do so would have produced evidence of the 
failure of government’s policy and would have required appropriate action.  
              The primarily symbolic nature of policy was associated with two other features of 
the educational landscape: firstly, its tendency to introduce new reforms at a rapid rate, but 
not to substantially resource them. Essentially, if policy primarily served a symbolic function, 
then there were few constraints to promoting new reforms in rapid succession. Further, as 
educational problems became more central to the public’s concerns and the policy agenda, so 
it  became necessary for the government  to  be seen to  be constantly responding to  those 
concerns and to promote new initiatives.  Teachers became jaded as they learnt to comply 
with,  rather than attempt  to  implement,  the latest  short-lived government  initiative.  Civic 
education was a prototype of this pattern with Guidelines (1985, 1996) extolling its value but 
with little support for their implementation.
              Secondly, when an educational problem was identified, the policy solution often 
involved  an  increase  in  bureaucratic  activity  and  the  creation  by  government  of  a  new 
institution or organisation designed to address the problem. Examples of this are the creation 
of the Institute of Language Education (ILE) and The Standing Committee on Language and 
Research (SCOLAR), both designed to help address the problem of the medium of instruction 
in schools. As Mak (1996:406) has observed:
Reform  measures  tend  to  get  translated  into  bureaucratic  activities  that  keep 
everybody busy but amount to little real change… We are quick to espouse trendy 
ideas – autonomy, excellence, school effectiveness, child centred learning, reflective 
teaching etc. as if they were proxies for deeds, yet our mind set remains technically 
oriented. Thus, reform measures that intend to liberate end up engulfed in the old 
machine. 
Consequently, a major barrier to the implementation of the current educational reforms is a 
long standing culture,  a  mixture  of inertia  and cynicism,  that  was established during the 
colonial period, and which continues. The continuing reform process also seems to result in 
considerable stress for teachers.  A study of over 1000 teachers reported in October 2002 
found  that  over  77%  felt  that  ‘frequently  changing  education  policies  caused  the  most 
pressure’(Chan,  F.,  2002).  A consequence  of  inertia,  cynicism and stress  is  that  teachers 
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continue to respond to reforms with a combination of suspicion, surface compliance and a 
‘wait  and  see’  attitude  fuelled  by  the  assumption  that  any  specific  reform will  soon  be 
replaced or dropped. The government’s desire to avoid conflict through the use of symbolic 
policy making was a relatively easy strategy in the more ‘loosely coupled’ areas such as those 
related to the school curriculum. Thus, both the Target-oriented Curriculum and the Bridge 
programme (which was intended to enable pupils to move from Chinese language to English 
medium instruction),  foundered  on the  suspicion  that  those  who  introduced  the  reforms, 
whilst serious in their intent to support school improvement, would soon move on and their 
policies replaced by new ones.  In other more directly coupled areas of policy,  symbolic 
gestures alone were insufficient. For example, in determining the mechanism used to select 
pupils for secondary schooling, rhetoric could not suffice and real policy choices had to be 
made.  However,  in  order  to  avoid  conflict,  or  its  corollary  (for  example,  to  maintain 
consensus),  compromises  were often made in  an attempt  to  satisfy potentially  competing 
groups of stakeholders. Thus, to satisfy the masses who desired access to good schools, an 
academic aptitude test was used to select pupils for secondary schooling. However, to ensure 
minimal disruption to the elite schools, pupils were placed in one of five bands according to 
their academic aptitude and schools were allowed to recruit a substantial proportion of pupils 
directly. The outcome was a seemingly meritocratic selection process for a highly segregated 
and elitist school system.
Whilst this might be viewed as anticipating political movements, such as the ‘third 
way’ and ‘compassionate conservatism’, its motive force in the 1970s had more to do with 
satisfying the competing demands of egalitarianism and elitism. The use of symbolic policy 
and compromises in education served the colonial  government well but it was sometimes 
necessary to go one step further to avoid open conflict. The best example of this arose in the 
mid 1970s when Social Studies was developed as a new school subject integrating History, 
Geography,  Economics  and  Civics.  However,  the  Chinese  History  community  objected 
strongly and portrayed the move as an attempt to dilute their subject and as a colonial plot to 
deny pupils access to their culture (Kan and Vickers, 2002). As the issue became public, the 
government  capitulated  and Social  Studies  emerged but without the inclusion of Chinese 
History.
The reason why the colonial government focused on the symbolic role of policy and 
avoided pushing implementation lay, as we have seen, in its tenuous legitimacy and inherent 
conservatism. The result was a desire to avoid any conflict, or forms of educational provision, 
which might subvert its role through the creation of conditions which would promote social 
or political disruption. To require schools to use Chinese or to require Chinese History to 
merge with (world) History would have been possible but would have resulted in conflict 
with powerful sectors of society, which could have threatened the stability of the government 
itself. Further, those groups who opposed reform (for example, the elite religious schools) 
were amongst the most ardent supporters of, and collaborators with, the colonial government. 
To  pursue  real  change  in  schools  would  have  required  the  use  of  more  direct  policy 
instruments  (for  example,  mandates  and sanctions).  This  would  have  invited  public  non-
compliance: enforcement  would have resulted in conflict  with the providers of education, 
who were sensitive to the expectations of parents, pupils and the universities. In effect, the 
tacit compact between the government and the schools was that reforms were respectively 
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symbolically  promoted  and  symbolically  adopted.  Few  real  changes  occurred  and  this 
satisfied the interests of both the government and the schools.
The government’s policy on the appropriate medium of instruction in schools and 
the attempt to move the curriculum away from its focus on discrete academic subjects are the 
best  examples  of  the  symbolic  nature  of  policy.  Thus,  for  example,  in  the  mid  1970s  a 
‘common core’ curriculum was introduced with Social Studies and Integrated Science as new 
subjects  to  replace  the  plethora  of  discrete  subjects  which  made  up  the  humanities  and 
sciences. However, the new subjects were merely added to the list of available subjects and 
the majority of schools decided not to adopt Social Studies and to teach the separate sciences 
(Physics, Chemistry and Biology) from S3 onwards. There was much policy-making at the 
centre but little reform in the schools. In the 1980s, similarly, the government’s attempt to 
broaden the  sixth  form curriculum by introducing  Liberal  Studies  as  a  core  subject  was 
abandoned in the face  of  opposition  from the universities.  In  another  critical  and highly 
contentious  area,  the government’s  promotion  of  Chinese medium instruction,  which had 
been policy since the 1970s, the schools largely ignored central directives. Nothing was really 
done to enforce or constructively implement the policy. Only in 1998 did the post-colonial  
government move to require the majority of schools to implement the policy.
              Most governments are inherently conservative as far as education is concerned for  
their fundamental goal is to socialize pupils in prevailing regime values and to prepare for the 
manpower needs of the economy. However, in the case of Hong Kong, many of the liberal 
sentiments  that  informed specific  innovations  (critical  thinking,  independent  thinking and 
active citizenship) were fundamentally in tension with the maintenance of a colonial political 
system. Consequently, they were often promoted more as rhetorical slogans than as agendas 
for change. Where change did occur, it tended to be in micro-level areas and was limited by 
the political parameters which constrained broader reforms. 
             The legacy of the pre-1997 approach to policy making and its implementation, which 
was characterized by the primacy of symbolism, compromise and accommodation, lies in the 
enduring expectations,  precedents and processes it has established. Basically,  teachers are 
cynical  about  reform  initiatives  which  are  seen  as  short-term  exercises  in  tokenism. 
Politicians view vocal opposition to any reform as sufficient to require its abandonment or 
substantial  modification.  For the post-handover  government,  which seems generally more 
determined than its predecessor to reform the education system and to enforce its policies, 
this legacy has been a major problem.
THE POST-HANDOVER GOVERNMENT AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM
 While the post-handover government has inherited both the structural and legitimacy 
problems  and  the  symbolic  policies  of  the  colonial  regime,  it  has  also  encountered  new 
difficulties  which  impede  implementation  and  which  have  created  new  tensions.  Two 
interrelated features  are especially pertinent.  The first  is  the emergence,  since 1997, of a 
‘disarticulated’ and a ‘polyarchic’ political system (Scott,  2000). The second is the highly 
destructive nature of Hong Kong’s political culture. The two are related, but both seem to 
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have  been  exacerbated  by,  rather  than  being  the  product  of,  the  post-handover  political 
context. 
The  key  feature  of  a  disarticulated  political  system  is  the  conflict  and  lack  of 
coherence between its component parts. In the post-handover system, this is a consequence of 
many different factors although the constitutional arrangements provided for under the Basic 
Law seem to have been particularly responsible for the friction which has developed between 
the executive and the legislature. The result has been that, in contrast to the publicly unified 
and centralized system which prevailed under colonialism, power has been dispersed, within 
what has become a polyarchic system, to many different centres of power. The executive 
retains  overall  control  but  it  is  itself  fragmented  and  its  ability  to  implement  policy  is 
constrained  by  legislators,  pressure  groups,  and  public  opinion  as  well  as  by  organized 
traditional street-level bureaucrats. Thus, in many areas of education policy, contradictory, or 
at least inconsistent, messages emerge from the Chief Executive, the various branches of the 
civil service, the Education Commission and other parts of the policymaking community. The 
facade  of  unity within  the  ranks of  government  has  disappeared  and power seems to be 
exercised and shared by a variety of groups within and outside the government. Thus, in the 
promotion  of  civic  education,  important  differences  relate  to  the emphasis  on patriotism, 
nationalism and Chinese cultural identity on the one hand, and, on the other, to the quest for 
critical  thinking and active and democratic citizenship.  This lack of consensus could be a 
positive influence, as it might encourage schools to recognize the complex and competing 
purposes  that  civic  education  serves.  Alternatively,  the  competition  between  the  various 
sectors of government could result in each negating any attempt to develop a coherent policy 
and resource curriculum development in this area. Similarly, the Chief Executive’s goal of 
achieving an ‘all graduate and all trained’ teaching profession has effectively been ignored as 
those  intermediate  bodies  responsible  for  translating  policy  intents  into  actions  have 
institutionalised  arrangements  to  allow  untrained  graduates  and  non-graduates  (termed 
‘permitted teachers’)  to be employed in schools. These features of Hong Kong’s political 
culture,  we  argue,  are  especially  destructive  for  educational  reforms  (Morris,  2002), 
especially in the post-1997 period when the government has attempted to implement policies 
more forcefully than its predecessor. The standard cycle of an educational reform typically 
has the following overlapping stages: 
• the identification of an area of concern in education and its formulation as 
a ‘problem’ with the subsequent need for a policy to address it;
• public support for change is encouraged by strong criticism of the object of 
change (for example, language standards, problem solving) by government 
officials   and/or  of  the  perceived  source  of  the  problem (for  example, 
curricula, schools, teachers, language standards, teacher education);
• a policy statement  ( for example, an Education Commission report) spells 
out the need for change, describes the weaknesses of the status quo and 
identifies  the broad policy intentions  (for example,  quality education,  a 
knowledge  society,  lifelong/lifewide  learning,  enhanced  teacher 
professionalism, the upgrading of teacher education) in a language which 
is essentially exhortatory;
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• policy  intents  are,  to  varying  degrees,  translated  into  specific  policy 
actions of a direct or indirect nature. 
The first three stages require that a clear problem should be identified. This often involves the 
identification of a specific group of providers who are the source of the problem and the 
target of the policy solution. Schools, teachers and teacher educators have all been identified 
at various stages by the government as the cause of one or more of the problems. This allows 
a clear policy solution to be identified (for example, testing teachers’ language standards by 
attempting to ‘benchmark’ them) and ensures that little ‘blame is directed at the government 
itself. This tendency for the government to base an education policy on a heavy duty criticism 
of its providers is linked to its lack of a political mandate.
Overall,  however, these three phases engender a lively public debate and a broad 
consensus. Little tension or conflict emerges because they are couched in terms (for example, 
quality teaching, learning to learn, generic skills) that require no real decisions or choices to 
be made in terms of ideology or of resources and they tend to target relatively weak sectors of 
the  community  or  institutions.  However,  the  fourth  stage,  which  involves  the  shift  from 
statements of broad policy intentions to their translation into policy actions, generates more 
debate and concern as the implications for the relevant stakeholders emerge. Recent examples 
are the decisions to assess teachers’ language proficiency in English (as one of the actions to 
upgrade the standard of language teaching); to merge the subjects of History and Chinese 
History  (as  an  attempt  to  integrate  the  two  and  reduce  the  number  of  discrete  school 
subjects); and to make some teacher educators redundant (as part of the upgrading of teacher 
education).  Each  of  these  policy  actions  resulted  in  an  outcry  from  politicians  and  the 
Professional  Teachers  Union (PTU),  who claimed  that  the  actions  were,  respectively,  an 
affront  to  teachers’  professionalism,  an  attempt  to  denigrate  the  community’s  Chinese 
cultural identity, and an initiative which had produced unnecessary conflict and anxiety. The 
attempt to introduce more mother language teaching in schools has resulted in a somewhat 
different  opposition  coalition  to  government  proposals.  Despite  support  from  many 
educational specialists and the PTU, the decision to reduce the number of English language 
medium schools provoked so many protests and petitions from parents, students and teachers 
that the government was forced, in part, to reverse its decision (Chan, E., 2002:276-79).  In 
colonial  times,  this  fourth  stage  of  actually  attempting  to  implement  policy  was  usually 
avoided, given the symbolic function of policy and the desire to avoid conflict. More recently 
however there has been greater concern by the government to ensure implementation and 
move to the fourth stage. Consequently, the resulting conflict associated with the fourth stage 
has been more evident.
Clearly this cycle is not unique to Hong Kong for many governments have resorted 
to creating what Ball (1994) terms a ‘discourse of derision’ as a platform to launch a policy 
initiative. Vague intentions are often used to achieve a loose consensus. Subsequently, the 
tensions  that  are  associated  with  the  implementation  of  specific  policy  actions  serves  to 
highlight  the  fundamental  dilemmas  of  schooling  that  face  all  societies.   However,  the 
strongly destructive character of this cycle and the tendency of the political classes to avoid 
promoting a constructive policy manifesto is distinctive to Hong Kong and may be explained 
by the nature of the political system.  Only a minority of members of the Legislative Council 
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are elected by universal suffrage, and of those a majority are members of the Democratic 
Party who have consistently won the elections and effectively received a mandate from the 
public.  However,  despite  their  political  legitimacy,  they  have  no  power  to  introduce  or 
implement policies and their sole influence on policy is essentially negative and often takes 
the form of blocking the necessary finances. Consequently, in the absence of this group of 
politicians being able to determine or substantially influence policy, their basic default role is 
that of an elected opposition which criticises the (unelected) government at every opportunity 
and occasionally blocks legislation. Hence, they will mete out criticism over the quality of 
education provided by the government at every opportunity, and subsequently criticize the 
government for taking any actions designed to address the problem they have identified. This 
scenario  encourages  political  theatre  and  posturing,  which  is  reinforced  in  the  area  of 
education by the strong connections between the Democratic Party and the largest public 
sector union in Hong Kong – the Professional Teachers’ Union. In effect, any attempt to 
promote educational change that goes beyond a broad statement of intent is likely to become 
the victim of this destructive cycle. Essentially, the constant feature of the political context 
that has affected the implementation of policy involves the tenuous legitimacy of both the 
colonial and post-colonial governments. This has occurred in a community which on most 
indicators  would be viewed as liberal  and with a vibrant  civil  society and a government 
which is broadly tolerant and benevolent. It is against this background that the government’s 
legitimacy is  contrasted.  A further  critical  difference between the pre-  and post-handover 
periods involves the state of the economy.  Whilst the colonial  government had a tenuous 
political legitimacy, it obtained a form of economic legitimacy by virtue of the rapid growth 
of the economy and the community’s rising affluence. The government was tolerated as it 
created an environment in which people could benefit from the growing economy. It could 
also, in a crisis, spend its way out of difficulties by distributing public goods, such as access 
to housing and education, more widely. In contrast, the post-handover government has been 
plagued  by the  effect  of  the  Asian  economic  recession  since  1997.  This  has  limited  its 
capacity to provide more subsidized public goods and it has removed a powerful source of 
legitimacy. Further, as whole areas of public policy, such as those related to the economy and 
defence, are largely determined by external forces, education, along with housing and social 
welfare, represents one field that can be usefully addressed by the Hong Kong government. 
Tung Chee Hwa himself  has said that ‘education policy is at the very core of our  social 
policy’  (Tung,  2000:17)  and  has  given  it  very  high  priority  on  the  policy  agenda.  The 
problem  is  that  it  is  encumbered  by  a  political  system  and  internal  constraints  on 
implementation which make success unlikely in the present environment.
CONCLUSIONS
          Implementation theory pays particular attention to the attempts of policy-makers to 
reach their objectives. The focus of the literature is principally on the constraints that face 
policy-makers,  not  on the overall  design and problems of implementation inherent  in the 
political system and the processes of policy-making within that system.  In this article, we 
suggest  that  there  are  indeed  problems  in  the  relationship  between  policy-makers  and 
implementers that have obstructed meaningful  educational reform in Hong Kong. But we 
have also pointed to wider systemic constraints, problems relating to the legitimacy of the 
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regime,  the  disarticulated  political  system  and  the  destructive  political  culture  that  have 
meant that education policies have often been framed in largely symbolic terms beyond the 
competence  of  both  education  policy-makers  to  rectify.  Education  policy-making  and its 
implementation in Hong Kong thus takes on a curious character. It is at once both a central  
concern and a neglected area; the more things change, the more they stay the same.
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